Staff Foreign Affairs Writer – April 18, 2025

The case of Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia, a 29-year-old Salvadoran national deported to El Salvador’s notorious CECOT mega-prison in March 2025, has ignited a firestorm of legal, political, and diplomatic debate. Federal courts, including a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, have ruled that Garcia’s deportation was illegal and ordered the Trump administration to “facilitate” his return to the United States. However, the administration’s resistance, coupled with El Salvador’s refusal to release him, raises profound questions about the Supreme Court’s authority to influence a sovereign nation, the transparency of alleged gang affiliations, and the path forward for Garcia. This article explores the case’s complexities, critiques the DOJ’s handling of evidence, and proposes best-case scenarios for Garcia’s future.

The Deportation and Court Orders

Kilmar Abrego Garcia, a Maryland resident for 14 years, was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on March 12, 2025, and deported to El Salvador three days later, despite a 2019 immigration judge’s withholding-of-removal order prohibiting his return to his home country. This protection stemmed from credible threats by the Barrio 18 gang, which extorted his family’s pupusa business and endangered his life as a teenager. The Trump administration, prioritizing deportation of alleged gang members, conceded the removal was an “administrative error” but insisted Garcia is a member of MS-13, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization.

Garcia’s attorneys, supported by his wife, Jennifer Vasquez Sura, deny the gang allegations, noting he has no criminal convictions in the U.S. or El Salvador. On April 4, U.S. District Judge Paula Xinis ruled the deportation “illegal” and ordered Garcia’s return, citing irreparable harm from his detention in CECOT, known for human rights concerns. The Supreme Court, in a 9-0 decision on April 10, upheld Xinis’s authority, directing the government to “facilitate” Garcia’s release from Salvadoran custody and ensure his case is handled as it would have been absent the error. The court, however, asked Xinis to clarify specific actions required, noting deference to the Executive Branch in foreign affairs.

The Trump administration has resisted compliance, arguing that U.S. courts cannot compel El Salvador to release Garcia. Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, in an April 14 Oval Office meeting with President Trump, refused to free Garcia, calling him a “terrorist” and claiming he cannot “smuggle” him into the U.S. The administration’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit and daily status updates ordered by Xinis (showing “no further updates” as of April 16) reflect ongoing defiance, escalating tensions between judicial and executive powers.

Supreme Court’s Reach: Can It Dictate to a Sovereign Nation?

The Supreme Court’s order to “facilitate” Garcia’s return raises a critical legal question: Can a U.S. court effectively dictate actions to a sovereign nation like El Salvador? The court’s directive does not directly command El Salvador but requires the U.S. government to take steps to secure Garcia’s release, such as diplomatic negotiations or leveraging financial agreements. The U.S. pays El Salvador to detain deportees at CECOT, undercutting claims of limited influence. Harvard constitutional law professor Laurence Tribe argues this case tests the rule of law, warning that unchecked executive power could allow the government to deport anyone to foreign prisons without recourse, regardless of citizenship.

Critics of the court’s ruling, including the Trump administration, contend it oversteps judicial authority by interfering with the president’s constitutional power over foreign affairs (Article II, Section 2). U.S. Solicitor General D. John Sauer argued that federal courts lack jurisdiction to “tell the Government of El Salvador what to do.” Yet, the Fourth Circuit countered that the U.S. has “no legal authority to snatch a person who is lawfully present” and deport them without due process, emphasizing judicial oversight of executive actions. The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision suggests a balance: courts can enforce due process domestically but must respect executive discretion in international relations.

This tension highlights a gap in international law. Sovereign nations are not bound by U.S. court orders, and El Salvador’s refusal to release Garcia underscores this reality. The U.S. could apply diplomatic pressure or adjust payments to CECOT, but such actions risk straining bilateral relations. The establishment narrative portrays the court’s order as a defense of due process, but critics argue it naively assumes U.S. leverage over Bukele’s hardline regime. The case exposes the limits of judicial power in a globalized world, leaving Garcia’s fate in diplomatic limbo.

DOJ Transparency: Time to Reveal Garcia’s Alleged Gang Ties

The Trump administration’s claim that Garcia is an MS-13 member relies heavily on a 2019 immigration court bail determination, based on a Prince George’s County police officer’s report. The officer, later fired for misconduct unrelated to Garcia’s case, cited Garcia’s clothing (a Chicago Bulls hat and a hoodie with money-themed designs) and a “proven and reliable” informant who alleged Garcia was an active MS-13 member of the Western Clique in New York—a state Garcia has never lived in. Garcia’s attorneys argue this evidence is flimsy, noting the officer’s credibility issues and the lack of corroboration. ICE’s 2019 attorney admitted in court that this was their only “intel” on Garcia.

Further allegations surfaced in 2025, with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claiming Garcia has a “history of violence” and was involved in “human trafficking,” without providing evidence. A 2021 temporary protective order filed by Vasquez Sura, later dismissed, described an altercation where Garcia allegedly punched and scratched her. Vasquez Sura clarified this was a precautionary measure after a disagreement, resolved through counseling, and not indicative of ongoing violence. The administration’s narrative leans on these unproven claims to justify deportation, while Garcia’s lack of criminal charges or convictions undermines their case.

It’s time for the DOJ to make public any credible evidence of Garcia’s gang connections. If MS-13 membership is substantiated, the government could legally reopen his immigration case to revoke his withholding-of-removal status, as required by law. Without transparency, the allegations appear as post hoc rationalizations for an illegal act. The establishment narrative accepts the government’s “error” framing but glosses over the lack of due process, while critics on X highlight the absence of concrete evidence, with some calling the gang claims “dismissed” based on apparel and associations. Public disclosure would clarify whether Garcia poses a genuine threat or if the administration is exploiting vague accusations to dodge accountability.

Best-Case Scenarios: Garcia’s Return to the U.S. or Remaining in El Salvador

Scenario 1: Return to the U.S.

• Outcome: The Trump administration complies with the Supreme Court’s order, negotiating with El Salvador to secure Garcia’s release from CECOT. He is granted humanitarian parole to reenter the U.S., as suggested by immigration expert Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, and his withholding-of-removal status is restored. Garcia resumes his life in Maryland as a sheet metal worker, living with his wife and three children, and continues annual ICE check-ins. The government reopens his immigration case to present new evidence of MS-13 ties, ensuring due process with a hearing before an immigration judge. If no credible evidence emerges, Garcia remains protected; if proven, he could face deportation to a third country.
• Feasibility: This requires diplomatic cooperation from Bukele, who has resisted releasing Garcia, and political will from the Trump administration, which has doubled down on its gang narrative. U.S. payments to CECOT provide leverage, but Bukele’s domestic popularity relies on his anti-gang stance, complicating negotiations. Senator Chris Van Hollen’s April 17 visit to Garcia in CECOT, where he confirmed Garcia’s well-being, may pressure both governments to act.
• Benefits: Restores due process, upholds the rule of law, and reunites Garcia’s family. It aligns with the Supreme Court’s directive and mitigates the constitutional crisis flagged by Democrats like Rep. Adriano Espaillat.
• Challenges: The administration’s defiance and Bukele’s refusal suggest resistance. If Garcia returns, DHS has warned it may detain and deport him to another country or attempt to terminate his protection, prolonging legal battles.

Scenario 2: Remaining in El Salvador

• Outcome: Garcia remains in CECOT or is transferred to a less restrictive facility in El Salvador, with assurances of humane treatment. The U.S. compensates his family for the illegal deportation and works with Salvadoran authorities to monitor his safety. Garcia’s withholding-of-removal status is voided due to his presence in El Salvador, but he is granted legal protections to avoid gang persecution, possibly through a Salvadoran program for at-risk individuals.
• Feasibility: More likely given Bukele’s stance and the Trump administration’s reluctance to retrieve Garcia. El Salvador’s vice president confirmed the U.S. pays to detain Garcia, suggesting a financial arrangement could incentivize his continued detention with improved conditions. However, CECOT’s harsh environment and lack of due process in Salvadoran prisons pose risks.
• Benefits: Avoids diplomatic escalation and aligns with the administration’s deportation goals. It sidesteps the challenge of compelling a sovereign nation to act, respecting El Salvador’s autonomy.
• Challenges: Violates the Supreme Court’s order, risking a constitutional standoff. Garcia’s safety in CECOT is uncertain, and his family faces prolonged separation. Critics, including Sen. Joaquin Castro, have called CECOT a “torture prison,” raising humanitarian concerns.

Conclusion

The Kilmar Abrego Garcia case is a flashpoint in the Trump administration’s mass-deportation campaign, exposing fault lines in U.S. immigration policy, judicial authority, and international relations. The Supreme Court’s unanimous order to facilitate his return underscores the primacy of due process, but its deference to executive foreign policy powers leaves Garcia’s fate uncertain. The court’s attempt to influence El Salvador indirectly tests the boundaries of U.S. judicial reach, revealing the complexities of sovereignty in a globalized world.

The DOJ must release any evidence of Garcia’s MS-13 ties to justify its actions or admit the allegations are baseless. Without transparency, the government’s narrative appears as a convenient excuse for an illegal deportation. The best-case scenario—Garcia’s return to the U.S. with restored protections—upholds justice but faces political and diplomatic hurdles. Alternatively, his continued detention in El Salvador with improved conditions may be more feasible but sacrifices due process and humanitarian principles.

As Sen. Chris Van Hollen presses for Garcia’s release and protests mount outside Maryland courthouses, the case remains a litmus test for the rule of law. Whether Garcia returns to his family or remains in CECOT, the saga underscores the human cost of immigration errors and the urgent need for accountability. The establishment narrative frames this as an isolated mistake, but critics see a broader erosion of rights—a tension that demands resolution through evidence, not rhetoric.